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Abstract. Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi
(1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-
Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect
dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional ‘moves’ in
which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and
Vohra (2017) point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make op-
timal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta
and Vohra (2017) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expecta-
tions that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the
Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The paper pro-
vides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions
of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing non-
emptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function
games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other
solutions.
∗The second author gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Clare Hall and INET at the University
of Cambridge. The paper has benefited from comments and discussions with Francis Bloch, Mert Kimya,
Debraj Ray, Rajiv Vohra, Hamid Sabourian, three anonymous referees, the Co-editor Dilip Mookherjee,
as well as comments from seminar participants in the University of Montreal, the annual Coalitions and
Networks Workshop in University of Glasgow, and the Paris School of Economics.
21. INTRODUCTION
The von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set has had a distinguished standing as
a solution concept in cooperative game theory. It is based on the notion of coalitional
dominance, with one social state y dominating state x if some coalition has the power
or ability to change the state from x to y and all members of the coalition prefer y to
x. von Neumann and Morgenstern identified a stable set as one which satisfied two
properties : (1) internal stability in the sense that no stable outcome dominates any
other stable outcome; (2) external stability in the sense that every outcome not in the
stable set is dominated by some stable outcome. Of course, the core, the set of states
which are not dominated by any other state, must be contained in any stable set. The
predominant position of the vNM stable set is evident from the large literature on this
solution concept.2
Both the core and the stable set are myopic solution concepts in the sense that a deviating
coalition only cares about the immediate consequence of a deviation. But if coalition S
decides to change x to y because the latter gives strictly higher payoffs to each member
of S, it does not ask itself whether y itself is a stable outcome. Conversely, the implicit
rationale of the vNM set is that if x is not dominated by any coalition, then x must be in
the solution set since no coalition objects to it. Harsanyi (1974) criticised the underlying
logic by pointing out the following. Suppose coalition S has the power to enforce y
from x. Suppose also that at least one member of S does not gain from the move to
y. Then, myopic solution concepts would decree that S will not in fact effect the move
from x to y. But now suppose that some state z which is deemed stable dominates y
and all members of S strictly prefer z to x. Harsanyi argued that S should in fact
move the state from x to y expecting the “final” outcome to be z. In other words, a
non-myopic or farsighted approach to coalitional stability negates the logic underlying
solution concepts such as the vNM stable set.
Following Harsanyi, there has been a large literature on solution concepts that are based
on “farsighted” individuals who base their decisions on whether to deviate from the
current status not on the immediate consequence of the deviation, but on how they will
fare at the “final” outcome following further deviations by other coalitions. 3 A common
feature in much of this literature is the absence of any extensive form specifying the order
in which players or coalitions move as well as any pre-specified set of terminal states.
2See Lucas (1992) for a survey.
3See, for instance, Chwe (1994), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi
and Xue (2003), Konishi and Ray (2003), Herings et al. (2004, 2009), Anesi (2010), Mauleon et al. (2011),
Vartiainen (2011), Anesi and Seidmann (2014), Ray and Vohra ( 2015), Chander (2015), Kimya (2015),
Dutta and Vohra (2017). Aumann and Myerson (1988) also modeled farsighted behavior, but from a
different perspective. Ray and Vohra (2014) provide an insightful survey of this literature.
3So, farsighted or forward looking behavior cannot be captured through the use of any
reasoning analogous to backwards induction.
Clearly, this approach requires the specification of the “final” outcome of any sequence
of coalitional deviations. Since pre-specified terminal outcomes do not exist in this
approach, the final outcome must be one from which no coalition wants to deviate. This
suggests that the final outcome is one which is “stable”. Then, farsightedness essentially
requires that a coalition compares the payoffs of its members at the current status quo
to what it expects will be their payoffs at the stable outcome that will be reached if
the coalition does deviate. But this implies that deciding on the stability of a particular
outcome against a sequence of moves requires us to know which other outcomes are
stable! This makes the notion of stability circular and suggests the use of a solution
concept based on the principles of internal and external stability that underlie the original
vNM stable set. Indeed, Harsanyi (1974) and much of the literature in this area after him
have modified the stable set by allowing for sequences of coalitional moves, so that both
internal and external stability are replaced by their farsighted counterparts.
Ray and Vohra (2014) raised an important issue with much of the literature. They
pointed out that the Harsanyi stable set and other variants do not restrict coalitions to
make optimal moves. That is, suppose x is the current status quo and coalition S is
contemplating a deviation. Then, if S has two possible deviations, with one devia-
tion Pareto-dominating the other, then it should not take the latter move. Moreover, all
coalitions that have deviated before S should also assume that S will only take Pareto-
undominated or maximal moves.4 The following comments of Ray and Vohra (2015)
about the existing farsighted solution concepts are instructive :
“Stable outcomes can be modeled either with optimistic beliefs or conservative beliefs or
perhaps some combination of the two. However, this is serious drawback of the blocking
approach”.
They go on to add : “A key requirement that is missing in the notion of farsighted block-
ing, is that of constraining objecting coalitions to make maximal moves (our emphasis)
among their profitable alternatives.”
Dutta and Vohra (2017) (henceforth DV) also point out that farsighted objections as typ-
ically modelled also permit coalitions to hold different beliefs about the continuation
path of coalitional moves. That is, x may not be in the farsighted stable set because
coalition S1 replaces it with y, anticipating a second, and final, move to z. At the same
time, another coalition S2 may deviate from x′ to y in the belief that the next (and final
move) will be to z′ (not z). That is coalitions S1 and S2 hold different beliefs about
4See Examples 1 and 2 in Section 4.
4the continuation from state y. DV refer to this issue as one of holding consistent be-
liefs, although they point out that such seemingly inconsistent beliefs may arise because
coalitional moves are history-dependent.5
DV incorporated maximality and consistency (or history independence) of beliefs in the
notion of farsighted stability. They use the tool of an expectation function, a concept
borrowed from Jordan (2006). In this framework, the expectation function describes the
transition from one state to another, as well as the coalition which is supposed to effect
the move. Thus, the expectation function represented the commonly held beliefs of all
agents about the sequence of coalitional moves, if any, from every state.6 The use of a
single expectation function immediately incorporates consistency.
Importantly, DV assumes that the transition from any state x to another state y only
depends on the current state. Together with the expectation function, each state is then
identified with a terminal or stationary outcome that is eventually reached from this
state. Using this correspondence, DV define the notion of Maximality of an expectation:
it is a move that a coalition cannot improve upon given the consequences of the devia-
tion. DV defined two versions of Maximality, one demanding that the move is maximal
for the active coalition and the other that the move is maximal for any relevant coalition.
The latter condition implies strong robustness but may also lead to existence problems.
The sets of stationary points of an expectation function satisfying one or the other no-
tion of maximality as well as farsighted versions of internal and external stability then
gave two different solution concepts. DV showed that these solution concepts are very
different from the ones defined earlier.
The point of departure in this paper is to incorporate history dependence into the DV
framework. Formally, this extension implies that a coalitional move may depend on the
past history of coalitional moves and not only on the current state. So, history depen-
dence permits coalitions to remember which coalitions or individuals have been active
and potentially condition their future behavior on the past experiences.
The dependence of coalitional moves on past history is intuitively appealing. For in-
stance, we are more likely to join groups of individuals with whom we have had a
pleasant experience in the past. Correspondingly, we are less likely to associate with
individuals who have lost our trust. Allowing agents to have memory is also standard in
non-cooperative games.
5Notice that in this example, the state y is reached along different histories of past coalitional moves.
6Although there is no extensive form in our framework, the imposition of commonly held beliefs about
continuation paths is analogous to that of such beliefs in non-cooperative equilibria such as subgame
perfection. For an alternative approach, see Bloch and van den Nouweland (2017) who allow individuals
to hold different beliefs about the path of future actions.
5Notice that since history independence is a special case of history dependence, the
DV solutions remain solutions in our framework. However, as is standard in the non-
cooperative framework, the introduction of history dependence expands the sets of stable
outcomes quite dramatically. In particular, it allows us to prove powerful nonemptyness
results - we show that the set of stable outcomes is non-empty in all finite games as well
as in all transferable utility partition function games. What is more, the latter result is
derived under the strong Maximality property of an expectation, implying remarkable
robustness of the solution.
Apart from expectation functions, a key tool in the paper will be objection paths. An
objection is a finite sequence of coalitional deviations starting from an initial state and
ending up in a terminal state, with the property that each coalition in the sequence strictly
prefers the terminal state to the state from which it is deviating. In other words, it
represents a farsighted objection. We will characterise our solution concepts in terms of
collections of such objection paths- the terminal states in the appropriate collection will
constitute a solution in our framework. While these are not ”direct” characterisations
since the necessary and sufficient conditions are not stated in terms of sets of states,7
we show subsequently that even the ”indirect” characterisations are remarkably useful -
they are used extensively in the proofs of the nonemptyness results as well in yielding
very transparent result on the structure of the solution(s). In particular, we are able to
show that our solution is always contained in Chwe’s largest consistent set. Since the
largest consistent set is viewed as being too permissive, this inclusion result is of some
interest.
The plan of the paper is the following. In the next section, we introduce some key
concepts. In section 3, we describe formally the framework introduced by DV, and then
go on to introduce our solution concepts. We discuss related solution concepts in Section
4. Section 5 contains our main characterisation results in terms of objection paths, while
section 6 contains the characterisation for simple games. An important byproduct of
the analysis for simple games is that notions of maximality are rendered irrelevant, in a
sense to be explained in section 5. We present two applications of our solution concept
in section 7. These applications demonstrate the importance of history dependence. In
section 8, we discuss some properties of our solution concepts. We go on to present the
nonemptyness results in section 8. We conclude in Section 9.
2. THE BACKGROUND
We consider a general setting, described by an abstract game, (N,X,E, ui(.)), where
N is the set of players and X is the set of outcomes or states. LetN denote the set of all
7We also provide an alternative characterisation in terms of sets of states for the special class of simple
games.
6non-empty subsets of N . An effectivity correspondence, E : X ×X → N , specifies the
coalitions that have the ability to replace a state with another state: for x, y ∈ X , E(x, y)
is the (possibly empty) set of coalitions that can replace x with y. We will sometimes
use E(x, S) to denote the set of states that coalition S can induce from x. Finally, ui(x)
is the utility of player i at state x.
The set of outcomes as well as the effectivity correspondence will depend on the specific
model that is being studied. For instance, in a partition function game, (N, v), the func-
tion v will specify a real number for each embedded coalition (S, pi) where pi denotes the
coalition structure with S ∈ pi being one of the coalitions in the partition pi. Feasibility
will imply that an embedded coalition (S, pi) can distribute at most v(S, pi) to individuals
in S. A state for partition function games will refer to a coalition structure pi and a cor-
responding payoff allocation which is feasible and efficient for each embedded coalition
corresponding to pi. Much of traditional cooperative game theory has focused on the
simpler but more restrictive transferable utility characteristic function games in which a
coalition can assure itself of a minimum aggregate utility v(S). The dominant tradition
in the literature has treated the set of states to be the set of imputations, the Pareto effi-
cient utility profiles in v(N), implicitly assumed that S ∈ E(x, y) iff yS ∈ v(S). Ray
and Vohra (2015) provide a convincing critique of why this assumption is unsatisfactory
for studying farsightedness. We return to this issue below.
State y dominates x if there is S ∈ E(x, y) such that uS(y)  uS(x).8 In this case we
also say that (S, y) is an objection to x.
The core is the set of all states to which there is no objection.
A set K ⊆ X is a vNM stable set if it satisfies:
• (Internal stability) For any x ∈ K, there is no y ∈ K such that y dominates x,
• (External stability) For any x /∈ K, there is y ∈ K such that y dominates x.
The core and vNM stable set are myopic solution concepts since they are based on
single rounds of deviations. In order to introduce farsighted solutions, it is convenient
to introduce the concept of objection paths.
DEFINITION 1. An objection path is a finite sequence (y0, S1, y1, . . . , Sm, ym) such that,
for all k = 1, . . .m, Sk ∈ E(yk−1, yk) and uSk(ym) uSk(yk−1).
Given the abstract game (N,X,E, ui(.)), we denote the set of all objection paths by P ∗.
We will often use P ⊆ P ∗ to denote a subset of objection paths, and Px to denote the
set of objection paths in P with initial element x. We will use px to denote a typical
objection path in Px, and µ(p) to denote the terminal state ym in the objection path
p = (y0, S1, y1, . . . , Sm, ym).
8We write uS(y) uS(x) if ui(y) > ui(x), for all i ∈ S.
7State y indirectly dominates x if there is an objection path px such that y = µ(px).
Farsighted or indirect domination takes into account forward looking behaviour because
at each point in the objection path, the deviating coalition takes into account the utility
profile not at the next state in the sequence but at the “final ” state in the objection path.
Of course, this leaves open the question of how the terminal state is determined. This is
going to be a central issue of the paper.
The relation of dominance or farsighted dominance depends on the specification of the
effectivity function. Ray and Vohra (2015) point out the importance of imposing appro-
priate restrictions on the effectivity function in the construction of farsighted solution
concepts. In the context of characteristic games, the standard practice allowed a coali-
tion S complete freedom to choose even the payoffs to individuals in the complementary
coalition N − S. Notice that this does not matter for solution concepts like the core or
the vNM stable set since these are based on myopic deviations - the deviating coalition
simply compares its own payoff allocations at the current state and the state following
immediately after the deviation.9 But why or how can coalition S dictate either the
payoffs accruing to the complementary coalition or how N − S organises itself after S
deviates? Of course, this does matter even in characteristic function games since it may
influence what coalitions form along the sequence. Ray and Vohra (2015) demonstrate
that this assumption can significantly alter the nature of the farsighted version of the
vNM stable set. They show that imposing reasonable restrictions on the effectivity cor-
respondence results in a farsighted stable set that is very different from that of Harsanyi
(1974).
We will impose the appropriate restrictions on the effectivity function when we apply
our solution concept to partition function games and simple games later on.
3. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND FARSIGHTED SOLUTION CONCEPTS
As we have mentioned earlier, DV incorporate both Maximality as well as common
beliefs about continuation paths (of coalitional deviations ) in their analysis. They use
an expectations function to model the transition from one state to another, as well as the
coalition which is supposed to effect the move. The use of an expectation function to
represent the transition from one state to another is adapted from Jordan (2006) who used
such a function to represent commonly held beliefs about the transition from any state to
the final outcome. The expectation function represents the commonly held beliefs of all
agents about the sequence of coalitional moves, if any, from every state. One can then
choose to impose restrictions on the expectation function in order to make the function
9Note that this aspect of the effectivity function is important even for myopic solution concepts of
partition function games since the deviating coalition has to “predict” what coalition structure will prevail
immediately after the deviation since its aggregate utility depends on what partition forms.
8reasonable. An obvious restriction is that the expectation function must be consistent
with the underlying game and hence with the effectivity function associated with the
game - it cannot specify a move from state x to state y by coalition S if S /∈ E(x, y).
Another restriction which is desirable is that the expectation function specify moves that
are optimal. We will describe below slightly different notions of degrees of optimality -
each will give rise to a specific restriction on the expectation function.
DV assumed that the process of transition is history independent ; that is, if the expecta-
tion function specifies a transition from state x to state y, then it must do so irrespective
of how state x is reached.10 The essential purpose of this paper is to show how the
DV analysis can be extended to incorporate history dependence into this transition pro-
cess. Allowing for history dependence obviously results in a more general framework
in which future coalitional moves can in principle depend on the evolution of past coali-
tional moves. There at least two reasons why this is an interesting exercise. We have
mentioned earlier that there are a variety of contexts where history does matter. More-
over, from a purely formal perspective, it is well known that history dependence enlarges
the set of noncooperative equilibria. In principle, this logic may carry forward to the
present context. Indeed, the applications later on illustrate the instrumental importance
of history dependence.
With this in mind, we define histories more formally. Let x0 be an initial status quo.
At period t = 0, 1, ..., coalition S can challenge the current state xt by demanding an
outcome xt+1 such that S ∈ E(xt, xt+1). In such a case, xt+1 becomes the new status
quo at period t + 1. If no coalition challenges some state x in period t, then the game
terminates and x is implemented. A history is a sequence (x0, S1, x1, ..., Sm, xm) that
specifies the past play path and coalitions that have been active till xm has been reached.
Let H represent the set of all (finite) histories, with a typical element h.
For any history h = (x0, S1, x1, ..., Sk, xk), we will use µ(h) to denote the terminal state
xk of h. Notice that all finite histories have well-defined terminal states.
We use the following notation on concatenation of path. For any history h, (h, S, x) is
the history reached by adding to h, the state x that is induced by coalition S from the
final state µ(h) of h. Note that S ∈ E(µ(h), x) for this to be valid.
Expectation Function
An expectation is a function F : H → N × X, specifying the active coalition and its
move for all possible current states and past histories.
10Note that, in our framework, we cannot interpret states as nodes of an extensive form game since a
state can be reached along several different objection paths.
9The expectation function “predicts” that one coalition is going to be active at any history,
without describing any explicit protocol which chooses the active coalition. 11
Denote F (h) = (S(h), f(h)), where f(h) is the state that is expected to follow at history
h, and S(h) is the coalition expected to induce the next state. If S(h) = ∅, then no coali-
tion wants to change the state and the final state of the history h will be implemented.12
As usual, history independence is a special case of history dependence. Consider any
two histories h, h′ ∈ H . Then, the DV expectation function satisfied F (h) = F (h′)
whenever µ(h) = µ(h′). So, the continuation path once a state x is reached does not
depend on whether the state was reached via history h or history h′.
Given an expectation F = (S, f), note that (h, S(h), f(h)) is also a history. We denote
F 0(h) = h, F 1(h) = F (h), and generally F k+1(h) = F (h, F 0(h), ..., F k(h)) for all
k = 0, 1, 2, ... . Similarly, denote by Sk(h) and fk(h) the first and second components
of F k(h), respectively, so that F k(h) = (Sk(h), fk(h)), for any k.
We say that history h is stationary if S(h) = ∅. If h is stationary, then we will also
denote by µ(h) the terminal point of h as a stationary point.
An expectation F is absorbing if, for every h ∈ H, there exists k such that Sk(h) = ∅.
A history (h, S1, y1, ..., Sm, ym) is an indirect objection to h if
(µ(h), S1, y1, . . . , Sm, ym) ∈ Pµ(h).
That is, the new history is formed from h by appending an objection path to it.
For an absorbing F , the path F (h) generated by F from history h, i.e.,
F (h) = (h, F 1(h), F 2(h), ...)
has a finite length, and µ(F (h)) is well defined for any h.
11A referee has questioned why only one coalition is assumed to move at any point. Consider an
extensive form or game tree which represents a specific protocol that describes the player who moves at
any particular node in the tree. The tree also describes the possible paths that may be followed from any
given node. Here, we have no explicit protocol. The expectation function is supposed to be a formalisation
of the commonly held beliefs of players about the continuation path from any given state, including the
coalition that is supposed to move. Notice that this assumption is implicit in all solution concepts based
on objection paths. However, the stronger version of Optimality - Condition M* to be defined later - does
allow for the possibility that a deviation can come from a coalition that is different from the one specified
by the expectation function.
12For history dependent solutions in related contexts, see Vartiainen (2011, 2014, and 2015).
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Let F (H) = ∪h∈H{F (h)} denote the sets of possible paths that is generated by an
absorbing F , by varying the initial history, and µ(F (H)) the stationary states associated
with these paths. Hence, assuming that expectation F is played in the continuation
game, µ(F (H)) is the set of states that can be eventually reached by starting from any
initial history. So, it makes sense to view µ(F (H)) as a farsighted solution when F is
the function describing the transition from state to state.
We now turn to the issue of describing “reasonable” restrictions on F keeping in mind
that these translate into restrictions on µ(F (H)), the set of stationary points.
We first describe two restrictions on the expectation F that are the farsighted analogues
of internal and external stability.
: (I) If h is a stationary history, then there does not exist y ∈ X and S ∈ E(µ(h), y)
such that (µ(h), S, y, F¯ (h, S, y)) is an objection path.
: (E) If h is a nonstationary history, then (µ(h), F (h)) is an objection path.
If Condition I is not satisfied, then for some stationary state x, there is a coalition S
which can deviate anticipating that the resulting sequence of transitions according to
F will lead to another stationary state that all members of S prefer. Clearly, this is a
violation of farsighted internal stability. Condition E states that if µ(h) is not a stationary
state, then some farsighted objection will result in a stationary state - this is an obvious
requirement of farsighted External Stability.
Notice that nothing has been said so far about the optimality of coalitional deviations
involved in any indirect objection implicit in Condition E. We now describe two different
versions of optimality or maximality.
: (M) If h is a nonstationary history, then there does not exist y ∈ X such that
S(h) ∈ E(µ(h), y) and uS(h)(µ(F (h, S(h), y))) uS(h)(µ(F (h))).
: (M*) If h is a nonstationary history, then there does not exist y ∈ X and S ∈
E(µ(h), y) such that S(h) ∩ S 6= ∅ and uS(µ(F (h, S, y))) uS(µ(F (h))).
Maximality assumes that at a nonstationary history x, some coalition S(h) is the coali-
tion that has the floor. Then, S(h) should not be able to deviate to another path that all
i ∈ S(h) prefer. Condition M* (Strong Maximality) is stronger. This allows for the
possibility that more than one coalition may be able to move at state x. For instance,
there may be some coalition S such that i ∈ S ∩ S(h) , y ∈ X with S ∈ E(µ(h), y) and
ui(µi(F (h, S, y))) > ui(µ(F (h))). Then, a “rational” i should join coalition S instead
of S(h). Condition M* precludes this possibility.
We will say that history dependent and absorbing expectation F is (strongly) rational,
abbreviated HRE (resp. HSRE), if it satisfies Properties I, E, and M (resp. M*).
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Our farsighted solution concepts are defined below.
DEFINITION 2. The set of stationary points, µ(F (H)) of an HRE (HSRE) F is his-
tory dependent (strongly) rational expectation farsighted stable set, abbreviated HREFS
(HSREFS).
In what sense is a set like HREFS (or HSREFS) a stable set? Given any history h, the
(absorbing) expectation function specifies that the terminal state µ(h) will be reached.
The property of being absorbing implies that no coalition wants to deviate once the
state µ(h) is reached. Of course, the terminal states of any absorbing expectation will
not constitute a reasonable stable set. This is where the conditions I, E, M and M*
come in by eliminating ad hoc absorbing expectation functions whose terminal points
do not satisfy intuitive notions of stability. It is worth pointing out that while any given
history will have only one terminal state, HREFS and HSREFS will in general be set-
valued since we have to consider the union of the terminal states of all histories - that is,
µ(F (H)). Indeed, like any vNM-type solution set, individual elements of µ(F (H)) are
not stable.
Of course, every HSRE is a HRE, and hence a HSREFS is a HREFS. But the converse
is not true.
REMARK 1. DV defined Conditions I, E, M and M* for expectation functions which are
history independent. They called their solution concepts REFS and SREFS. Of course,
any set which is REFS is also HREFS and similarly any SREFS is HSREFS.
4. RELATED SOLUTION CONCEPTS
Following Harsanyi (1974), there have been several papers modelling farsighted coop-
erative solution concepts, several of them being based on indirect domination.
Many of these farsighted solution concepts are either implicitly or explicitly based on
notions of sequences of objections or paths as we have defined here. Suppose that the
“current” state is x and coalition S is contemplating whether to deviate from x to y. In
a farsighted solution concept, it has to look ahead to the terminal state of the sequence
of deviations that will take place after y. Obviously, a coalition can consider further
deviations and indeed several coalitions may contemplate deviations. So, there can be
multiple objection paths from y, and typically S itself has no control over which one
will actually take place. The multiplicity of such paths has resulted in a multiplicity of
different solution concepts.13 We discuss here some of these solution concepts as well
as how they compare to HREFS and HSREFS.
13Many of the solution concepts based on farsightedness can also be viewed through Greenberg’s
(1990) theory of social situations.
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An “obvious” way of introducing farsightedness - and one suggested by Harsanyi him-
self - is to modify the original vNM solution by replacing the direct domination relation
by the indirect domination relation. Chwe (1994) was the first to define this formally.
His definition is given below.
DEFINITION 3. A set F ⊆ X is a farsighted stable set if it satisfies: :
• (Farsighted internal stability) For any x ∈ F , there is no y ∈ F such that y
indirectly dominates x,
• (Farsighted external stability) For any x /∈ F , there is y ∈ F such that y indi-
rectly dominates x.
The farsighted stable set is based on an optimistic view of the coalitions involved in an
indirect objection - a state is dominated if there exists some path that leads to a better
outcome. Chwe (1994) proposed a farsighted solution concept based on conservative or
pessimistic behavior.
DEFINITION 4. A set K ⊆ X is consistent if
K =
{
x ∈ X : for all y and S with S ∈ E(x, y), there is z ∈ K such that ((z = y)or (z indirectly dominates y)) and uS(z) 6 uS(x)
}
.
Thus, any potential move from a point in a consistent set is deterred by some indirect
objection that ends in the set. Chwe shows that there exists one such set which contains
all other consistent sets, and defines this to be the largest consistent set (LCS). Chwe
himself points out that the LCS is a weak solution concept that is “not so good at picking
out, but ruling out with confidence”.14 For example, the LCS may contain elements not
in the core. Nevertheless, the largest consistent set is an important concept that has
received much attention in the literature.
Several papers have used either the farsighted stable set or its variants in specific con-
texts. For instance, Beal et al (2008) study farsighted stability in transferable utility
games, while Bhattacharya and Brosi (2011) extend the analysis to NTU games. Some
authors have also analysed farsighted stability in hedonic games. These include Di-
amountoudi and Xue (2003, 2007), Mauleon, et al (2011). The latter analyse one-to-one
matching markets and show, surprisingly, that a set of matchings is a farsighted stable
set if and only if it is a singleton element of the core.
Herings et al (2009, 2010) are two notable recent solutions with connections to far-
sighted stable sets. Herings et al (2009) analyse farsighted stable networks in a model
where, as in much of the literature on networks, only two-person coalitions can form and
can change only one link at a time (these are assumptions on the effectivity function).
Their solution called pairwise farsighted stability requires farsighted external stability
14See Chwe (1994), page 300.
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but no version of internal stability. Instead, deviations from inside the stable set to
anything outside are required to be deterred by the possibility of becoming (weakly)
worse-off, and a minimality requirement is also imposed since (in the absence of inter-
nal stability), the entire set of networks satisfies the two conditions. Herings et al (2010)
apply the same solution concept to hedonic games where outcomes are partitions of N
and individual payoffs are defined directly on partitions. However, like Herings et al
(2009), they do not impose internal stability. 15
The next couple of simple examples, adapted from Xue (1998), Herings et al (2004),
Kimya (2017) illustrate some drawbacks of these solution concepts.
Example 1
(1,1)
(0,0)
(10,10) (0,20)
a
b
c d
{1}
{2} {2}
Both c and d belong to the farsighted stable set since they are terminal states. Since
there is a farsighted objection from a to c, the former is not in the farsighted stable set.
However, this is based on the expectation that player 2 will choose to replace b with c
rather than d even though 2 prefers d to c. If 2 is expected to move, rationally, to d, then
a should be judged to be stable, contrary to the prediction of the farsighted stable set.
15The lack of internal stability allows Herings et al (2009, 2010) to prove a strong existence theorem.
Most history-independent farsighted (and myopic) solution concepts that use both internal and external
stability typically fail to guarantee a nonempty solution when the indirect domination relation is cyclic as
in the voting paradox.
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Note that a belongs to the LCS because of the possibility that the final outcome is d. So
in this example the LCS makes a more reasonable prediction than the farsighted stable
set.
Example 2
(1,1)
(0,0)
(2,20) (-2,4)
a
b
c d
{1}
{2} {2}
Now the optimal move for player 2 is to choose c rather than d. The LCS and farsighted
stable set remain unchanged. But now it is the LCS which provides the wrong answer
because player 1 should not fear that player 2 will (irrationally) choose d instead of c.
In this example, the farsighted stable set makes a more reasonable prediction. The LCS
is {a, c, d} and is a strict superset of HREFS, which is {c, d}.
We show in Proposition 2 below that HREFS is a subset of LCS. Another notable refine-
ment of LCS is the Largest Cautious Consistent Set (LCCS) by Mauleon and Vannetel-
bosch (2004) which assumes “cautious” coalitional behavior. Cautiousness is a response
to the criticism of LCS that a blocking of an element in LCS can be deterred by the mere
possibility that a post blocking objection path may lead to an outcome in the LCS that
makes the blocking coalition indifferent between blocking or not, even if the other ob-
jection paths leading back to the consistent set are strictly profitable for the blocking
coalition. Notice that in this case, the coalition can only win by blocking. However,
LCS will include the initial element. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch correct for this by
imposing the requirement that a potential deviating coalition assigns strictly positive
probability to all objection paths.
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While the LCCS certainly does correct one problem inherent in the LCS, its basic logic
is somewhat similar to that of LCS. In particular, it does not require optimal behaviour
on the part of coalitions. That is, LCCS does not satisfy Maximality. Notice that in
Example 2, the LCCS may coincide with the LCS and thus make the wrong predic-
tion.16 There is also no clear relationship between the LCCS and HREFS. For example,
as demonstrated by Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) LCCS can be empty even in
finite games, whereas we show below that HREFS is always nonempty in this class of
games. Furthermore, Example 3 below (Figure 2 in Mauleon and Vannetelbosch 2004)
demonstrates that LCCS can be a strict subset of HREFS/SREFS. There, LCCS is {c, d}
whereas one HREFS (and hence LCS) is {a, c, d}. Since HREFS depends on the expec-
tation function, there may not be a unique HREFS - the solution will depend on whether
2 or {1, 3} is expected to move from b. In fact, one HREFS coincides with the LCCS.
Of course, HREFS may also be contained in LCCS as shown in Example 2.
Example 3
(1,0,0) (2,0,0)
(3,0,1)
(1,2,1)
a b c
d
{1}
{1,3}
{2}
Xue (1998) also argued that the LCS and farsighted stability did not really incorporate
farsighted behaviour. He suggested that the focus should be on stability of objection
paths rather than the terminal outcomes. He defined stable paths to be ones which satis-
fied analogues of Greenberg’s optimistic and conservative standards of behavior. Notice
that neither standard of behavior incorporates Maximality. Importantly, Herings et al
16Example 2 also shows that there may be a multiplicity of LCCS, depending on the probability distri-
butions over objective paths. Of course, the imposition of Maximality rules out the move of 2 from b to
d, and hence selects a unique continuation path from b to c.
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(2004) and Ray and Vohra (2015) point out other problems with Xue’s approach, aris-
ing essentially from any lack of a protocol specifying the order in which coalitions can
move.
One way of interpreting Examples 1 and 2 is that Maximality imposes the type of logic
inherent in backwards induction, or more generally subgame perfection. In a recent
interesting paper, Kimya (2017) also formulates two solution concepts that integrates
coalitional analysis with noncooperative logic. Kimya too focuses on paths with ele-
ments being triples of the form (x, y, S) with S ∈ E(x, y) and x, y ∈ X .17 A coalitional
behavior φ (or coalitional strategy) is a complete plan of action at every state. A coali-
tion S can deviate from the prescribed behavior φ at state x if S intersects T where
T is the coalition that is supposed to move at x. The specification of a coalitional be-
havior φ with reference to which deviations can take place plays a role very similar to
expectations functions and so incorporates consistency.
The coalitional deviation of S from φ is profitable if a deviation by S is profitable at
every node at which an action changes; that is, everybody in S prefers the new path
of play to the initially prescribed path of play. Kimya defines a coalitional behavior
φ to be an equilibrium coalitional behavior (ECB) if there does not exist a profitable
coalitional deviation from φ. ECB satisfies Strong Maximality; indeed, Kimya shows
the coincidence between the terminal outcomes supported by ECB and SREFS in any
abstract game.
He defines a credible set of coalitional behaviors to be a set of coalitional behaviors such
that any profitable deviation from a coalitional behavior in the set is followed by further
profitable deviations back into an element in the credible set that makes one of the initial
deviators worse off. Kimya defines a coalitional behavior to be a credible ECB (CECB)
if it is immune to profitable and credible deviations. Note that since coalitional strategies
are strategies that are defined on states and not histories, these are essentially Markov-
ian. So, CECB and ECB are history independent solutions analogous to those in Dutta
and Vohra (2017). Moreover, due to different criteria for credible deviation, Kimya’s
solution CECB does not have a clear relationship with the solution of the current paper,
or that of Dutta and Vohra (2017); neither solution implies the other.
Kimya shows that CECB exists in all finite games, but has no characterization result. He
also states that CECB is not a “satisfactory solution concept for characteristic function
games” partly because CECB depends on a type of backwards induction that is not
possible in this class of games.
17Mariotti (1996) restricts attention to normal form games and also focuses on objection paths. How-
ever, he assumes optimistic behavior on the part of deviating coalitions. Hence, his solution violates
Maximality.
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Herings et al. (2004) and Granot and Hanany (2016) propose solution concepts on
the abstract game by constructing noncooperative extensive form games. Granot and
Hanany (2016) assume that nature chooses the coalition that moves at any stage, with
each coalition allowed to remain at the current state or select a new outcome according
to the effectivity function. Their solution concept is the set of outcomes that can be
supported as the subgame perfect equilibria of the extensive form game. They are able
to show existence only for finite set of states.18 They also need to impose the assumption
that players are pessimistic in order to make the solution concept independent of nature’s
moves. This is of course a violation of Maximality. Herings et al (2004) define a notion
of social rationalizability in their multi-stage games. Herings et al study rationalizable
strategies and the resulting outcomes in a game form that specifies how coalitions are
formed. Like the largest consistent set, social rationalizability of Herings et al is meant
to be a “weak” concept that removes strategies with confidence but does not predict or
explain which of them are eventually taken. In particular, it does not attempt to provide
an equilibrium story of coalition formation. Interestingly, Herings et al(2004) construct
an example in which the LCS excludes too much. Since HREFS is a subset of LCS, it
too will exclude too much in this specific example.
The solutions discussed so far are all history independent. We close this section with a
couple of examples illustrating the role of history dependence.
Example 4
(3,3,3)
(0,0,0)
(4,4,0) (4,0,4) (0,4,4)
a
b
c d e
{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3}
18Herings et al (2004) also assume a finite set of states.
18
In this example, a is the surplus-maximising outcome, and hence the unique socially
efficient outcome corresponding to the utilitarian rule. However, none of the history-
independent solutions other than the LCS and LCCS can support a as an outcome. All
the majority coalitions have profitable deviations from b. History independence means
that which coalition moves is independent of previous movements. In particular, pun-
ishments are not possible. So, whichever coalition(s) is expected to move at b will also
want to move from a to b. So, the prediction must be that {c, d, e} (the set of terminal
outcomes) constitute the set of stable outcomes. Consider, however, how this prediction
changes when history dependence is introduced. Suppose, for instance, that S = {1, 2}
deviates from a to b. Then, one of the players in S, say 1, can be punished for the devi-
ation by choosing the continuation path to be {2, 3} moving to e. Clearly, any deviation
from a can be punished in this way by making the continuation path from b dependent
on the initial deviation from b. Hence, HSREFS and so HREFS will be {a, c, d, e}.
REMARK 2. In this example, the LCS coincides with HREFS. However, the permissive-
ness of the LCS can easily be demonstrated by embedding this example in a bigger one
as follows. Consider two new alternatives f with utility vector (1, 1,−0.25) and g with
utility vector (1, 1,−0.5). Let {3} ∈ E(f, b) and {1, 2} ∈ E(b, g). Then, 3 will not
deviate from f to b under the pessimistic expectation that {1, 2} might move to g from
b. However, this is a violation of maximality - the optimal move for {1, 2} from b is to c
which is better than f for 3.
Finally, History Dependence also helps in establishing existence of a nonempty solution
set in situations where several history dependent solutions will be empty. One example
in which this is the case is the three-player NTU ‘roommate game’ depicted below.
Example 5
From every state there is one two-player coalition that gains by moving to another state.
a
(3, 2, 1)
c
(1, 3, 2)
{2, 3}
c
(2, 1, 3)
{1, 3}{1, 2}
It is easy to see that this games possesses no vNM stable set, no farsighted stable stable,
no ECB and no REFS.
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In section 7 below, we describe two specific examples which illustrate the same general
principles outlined here through abstract games.
5. CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we provide characterization results for HREFS and HSREFS of abstract
games. Our characterization exercises are not directly in terms of sets of states, but in
terms of the terminal states of sets of objection paths. That is, we provide necessary and
sufficient conditions so that the terminal states corresponding to any set P of objection
paths will be HREFS (or HSREFS) iff P satisfies these conditions.
While we are aware that it may be difficult to check whether a specific subset of states
satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition, it is very handy in proving general
nonemptyness results - we provide constructive proofs of nonempty HREFS in all finite
abstract games as well as a nonempty HSREFS in all superadditive partition function
games. The characterization results also throws light on the logical structure of sets of
HREFS, including the fact that a largest HREFS exists for all finite games. Finally, the
characterization is employed when we analyze the relationship of HREFS and HSREFS
to other solution concepts. In particular, the characterization proves useful in showing
that every HREFS is a subset of the LCS.
Recall that we will use px, py, etc. to denote objection paths with initial state x, y.
Similarly, given any set of objection paths P , we will use Px to denote the subset of
objection paths in P with initial state x.
DEFINITION 5. Let P be a collection of objection paths.
• An objection path p = (x0, S1, x1, ...) is S1−dominated in P via y if S1 ∈
E(x0, y) and uS1(µ(py)) uS1(µ(px0)), for all py ∈ P .
• An objection path (x) is S-dominated in P via y if S ∈ E(x, y) and uS(µ(py))
uS(x) for all py ∈ P .
That is, an objection path p is dominated via node y in the set P of paths if the members
of the first active coalition profit by directing the play to node y rather than continuing
along the path p to the terminal state. Notice that the definition requires that once S1
deviates to y, it takes into account the possibility that any objection path in P with y as
the original state may be followed in future. Clearly, if this condition is satisfied, and
S1 believes that only the set of paths P are “possible” paths that can be followed, then
it cannot be optimal for S1 to move to x1. Part (ii) stipulates that if x is not followed
by any other state, i.e. is stationary, then any coalition can dominate it via some y if an
analogous condition is satisfied.
DEFINITION 6. A collection of objection paths P is coherent if:
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(1) The set Px is nonempty, for all x ∈ X ,
(2) If (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P, then (xk, Sk+1, ...) ∈ P , for all k = 0, 1, ...,
(3) If (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P, then (x0, S1, ...) is not S1−dominated in P (via any y),
(4) If (x) ∈ P, then (x) is not S−dominated in P (via any y), by any S.
REMARK 3. Suppose µ(p) = x for some p ∈ P , where P is a coherent collection of
paths. Then, by part (2) of Definition 6, (x) ∈ P .
Our first theorem shows that any HREFS must be the set of terminal states of a coherent
collection of objection paths.19
The first two conditions are obvious. The first condition requires that the set P must
contain at least one objection path with initial state x for every state. After all, we must
be able to predict what happens starting from any initial state x. The second condition
states that if an objection path p is in P , then any objection path which is a subpath of
p must also be in P . Conditions 3 and 4 are in some sense the two crucial conditions.
Suppose condition 3 is not satisfied by some set P . Then, P must include an objection
path p = (x0, S1, x1, ..) that is S1 dominated in P via some y. This would mean that
S1 can deviate to y and be assured that all paths in Py make it strictly better off than
following the path p. This implies that S1 is not taking a maximal move if it moves from
x0 to x1. Condition 4 requires that if (x) is in P , and hence x is a terminal state of a
path in P , then not deviating from x must be a maximal move for every coalition. We
are going to show that the terminal states of paths in a coherent collection P constitute
an HREFS. Condition 4 is required to ensure that I is satisfied.
THEOREM 1. A set Y ⊆ X is HREFS if and only if Y ≡ µ(P ) for some coherent
collection of objection paths P .
The proof of the theorem will follow from two lemmas.
LEMMA 1. Let F be a history dependent, absorbing expectation function satisfying
conditions I, E and M. Then, F (H) is a coherent collection of objection paths.
Proof. Since F is absorbing, F consists of finitely long paths. Moreover, for any non-
stationary configuration (h), F (h) is an objection path by Property E.
We now check the defining conditions of a coherent collection of paths. Take any history
h such that µ(h) = x.
First, if S(h) = ∅, then F (h) = (x). If S(h) 6= ∅, then, by Property E, there is S ∈
E(x, y) such that uS(µ(F (h, S, y)))  uS(x). By construction, F (h, S, y) ∈ F (H).
Thus, in all cases, F (h) ∈ F (H)x for all x ∈ X .
19Path based coalitional solutions include Xue (1998), Mariotti (1997), and Kimya (2017). However,
as discussed in section 4, they are based on assumptions that are, in general, not compatible with HREFS
and, hence, not directly comparable to Coherence.
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Second, since F (h) = (F (h), F (h, F (h))), and (F (h), F (h, F (h)) ∈ F (H) it follows
by induction that if (x0, S1, x1, ...) ∈ F (H), then (xk, Sk+1, ...) ∈ F (H) for all k =
0, 1, ....
Next, suppose thatF (h) is S(h)-dominated inF (H) via y. Then uS(h)(µ(F (h, S(h), y)))
uS(h)(µ(F (h))). But this violates Property M.
Finally, suppose that F (h) is S-dominated in F (H) via y. Then uS(µ(F (h, S, y))) 
uS(µ(h)) for some S such that S ∈ E(µ(h), y). But this violates Property I.
This shows that F (H) satisfies all the four requirements defining a coherent set of ob-
jection paths.
We now want to prove the converse result; if P is a coherent collection of objection
paths, then the terminal states associated with P is HREFS. The proof of the claim is
constructive - given any coherent set P , we specify an absorbing expectations function
satisfying Properties I, E and M.
LEMMA 2. If P is any coherent collection of objection paths, then µ(P ) is HREFS.
Proof. Fix a coherent collection of objection paths P for the rest of the proof.
Take any path px = (x, S1, . . .) ∈ P and pair (S, y) such that S ∈ E(x, y) with
S = S1 if px 6= (x). Define a function ξ with the property that ξ(px, (S, y)) ∈ P
and uS(µ(ξ(px, (S, y)))) 6 uS(µ(px)) Such a function ξ must exist for each such
(px, (S, y)) from Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 6.
Given a coherent collection of objection paths P , we now construct a history dependent
and absorbing expectation function F P such that µ(F (H)) = µ(P ).
Interpret P as an index set and let {Hp}p∈P be a partition of the set of histories H . We
construct F P that is measurable with respect to this partition so that for each p ∈ P , and
histories h, h′ ∈ Hp, F (h) = F (h′). So, each element Hp of the partition of H contains
all the relevant information concerning the past coalition actions.
We specify the partition of H recursively. For each x ∈ µ(P ), from Remark 3, we
know that (x) ∈ P . For each such x, let (x) ∈ H(x). Recursively, take any px0 =
(x0, S1, x1, . . .) ∈ P and h ∈ Hpx0 . Let S ∈ E(x0, y) be such that S = S1 if S1 6= ∅,
and let
(1) (h, S, y) ∈
{
H(x1,S2,...), if (S, y) = (S1, x1),
Hξ(px0 ,(S,y)), if (S, y) 6= (S1, x1).
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Proceeding from the initial history ∅, each element in the set of histories H is allocated
into exactly one element of {H(x0,S1,...)}(x0,S1,...)∈P . Note that if h ∈ H(x0,S1,...), then
µ(h) = x0.
Construct now an expectation F P such that, for any h ∈ H(x0,S1,...),
(2) F P (h) =
{
(S1, x1), if S1 6= ∅,
(∅, x0), if S1 = ∅.
First, we check that F P is absorbing.
Take any (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P and any h ∈ H(x0,S1,...). Then F P (h) = F 1(h) = (S1, x1),
F P (h, F P (h)) = F 2(h) = (S2, x2), and so on. Thus F P continues along the path
(x0, S1, x1, S2, ...) ∈ P until a stationary state is reached. Since any objection path is
finitely long, F is absorbing.
We now verify the three properties of a rational expectation.
Property I: Suppose that h is a terminal history. Then h ∈ H(µ(h)). Consider y such
that S ∈ E(µ(h), y). Then, (h, S, y) ∈ Hξ((µ(h),(S,y)). By the construction of F P ,
(y, F 1(h, S, y), F 2(h, S, y), ...) = ξ((µ(h)), (S, y)). By the definition of ξ, uS(µ(ξ(µ(h), y))) 6
uS(µ(h)).
Property E: Suppose that h is a nonterminal history. Find the path (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P be
such that h ∈ H(x0,S1,...). By the construction ofF P , (F 1(h), F 2(h), ...) = (S1, x1, S2, ...).
Since (x0, S1, x1, S2, ...) is a finitely long objection path, the continuation play leads a
terminal history (h, F 1(h), F 2(h), ...) = (h, x0, S1, ...), which is an indirect objection to
h.
Property M: Suppose that h is a nonterminal history. Find the path (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P be
such that h ∈ H(x0,S1,...). Then x0 = µ(h). Take any y such that S1 ∈ E(x0, y). By
the construction of F P , (y, F 1(h, S, y), F 2(h, S, y), ...) = ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)). By the
definition of ξ, uS1(µ(ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)))) 6 uS1(µ((x0, S1, ...))).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemmas 1 and 2 prove Theorem 1.
Of course, neither the theorem nor the lemmas throw any light on the existence of a co-
herent collection of paths, nor how such a set can be identified if it exists. The following
example demonstrates that the rudimentary structure of the abstract game does not itself
guarantee the existence of a coherent collection of paths, and hence a HREFS.
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Consider a one agent N = {1} decision problem with X = (−1, 0), and where {1} ∈
E(x, y) if and only if y = x/2. Let u1(x) = x for all x ∈ X . Now any (trivial) objection
path (x) except (0) is dominated via x/2. Hence the only candidate for the HREFS is
{0}. But there is no finite objection path that initiates from any x and ends in 0. Hence
Condition 6.1 is violated by any collection of paths, and there cannot be any HREFS.
Our objective is to prove the existence of HREFS in a large and natural class of games.
We will, in fact, provide a sufficient condition for a stronger version of the solution,
HSREFS. To this end, we will define a stronger version of Coherence.
DEFINITION 7. A collection of objection paths P is strongly coherent if,
(1) Px is nonempty, for all x ∈ X,
(2) If (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P, then (xk, Sk+1, ...) ∈ P for all k = 0, 1, ...,
(3) If (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P, then (x0, S1, ...) is not S−dominated in P (via any y), for
any S such that S1 ∩ S 6= ∅,
(4) If (x) ∈ P , then (x) is not S−dominated in P (via any y), for any S.
So, strong coherence strengthens Condition 6 3, all other requirements being the same as
for coherence. The strengthening involves ensuring that any coalition with a nonempty
intersection with S1 should not want to deviate.
THEOREM 2. If P is a strongly coherent collection of objection paths, then µ(P ) is
HSREFS.
Proof. Let P be some strongly coherent collection of objection paths. We construct an
HSRE F P such that F (H) = P .
Identify a function ξ that is defined for each pair ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)) such that (x0, S1, ...) ∈
P and S ∈ E(x0, y) with S1 ∩ S 6= ∅ if S1 6= ∅. Then ξ is defined by the property that
ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)) ∈ Py and
uS(µ(ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)))) 6 uS(µ((x0, S1, ...))),
for any pair ((x0, S1, ...)(S, y))).
Since P satisfies Definition 7, such a function ξ does exist.
As before, interpret a Strong coherent path structure P as an index set and let {Hp}p∈P
be a partition of the set of histories H . We construct F that is measurable with respect
to this partition.
We specify the partition of H recursively. As before, let (x, ∅) ∈ Hx for all x ∈ µ(P ).
For any history h, find (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P such that h ∈ H(x0,S1,...) . For any S and y such
that S ∈ E(x0, y) and such that S1 ∩ S 6= ∅ if S1 6= ∅, let
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(3) (h, S, y) ∈
{
H(x1,S2,...), if (S, y) = (S1, x1),
Hξ((x0,S1,...),(S,y)), if (S, y) 6= (S1, x1).
Then, each element in the set of histories H is allocated into exactly one component of
the partition {Hp}p∈P . Note that, by construction, µ(h) = x0 for all h ∈ H(x0,S1,...).
Construct now an expectation F such that, for any h ∈ H(x0,S1,...),
(4) F P (h) =
{
(S1, x1), if S1 6= ∅,
(∅, x0), if S1 = ∅.
It suffices to verify Property M* since the rest of the proof is identical to that of Lemma
2. Suppose that h is a nonstationary history. Find the path (x0, S1, ...) ∈ P be such
that h ∈ H(x0,S1,...). Then x0 = µ(h). Take any S and y such that S ∈ E(x0, y) and
such that S1 ∩ S 6= ∅. By the construction of F P , (y, F 1(h, S, y), F 2(h, S, y), ...) =
ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)). By the definition of ξ, uS(µ(ξ((x0, S1, ...), (S, y)))) 6 uS(µ((x0, S1, ...))).
We will use these characterisation theorems repeatedly in subsequent sections. In par-
ticular, we will use Theorem 2 to construct nonempty HSREFS in all superadditive
transferable utility partition games, as well as non-empty HREFS in all finite games.
6. SIMPLE GAMES
In this section, the focus is on the class of NTU simple games, which we formalise
by a non-empty set W of winning coalitions and the set of states X . von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) described simple games by a characteristic function v such that
v(S) = 1 if S ∈ W and v(S) = 0 otherwise.20 Of course, this assumes that utility is
transferable and winning brings the same aggregate benefit to the winning coalition. We
use a different formalisation of simple games, motivated at least partly by the kind of
contexts that are typically mentioned as potential applications of simple games. Con-
sider, for instance, a legislature which has to choose whether to pass a bill along with
a set of possible amendments. Or consider a committee voting on an up-or-down deci-
sion. In such cases, the rules of the legislature or the committee specify what groups of
individuals are decisive ( or winning) in the sense of being able to take decisions, and so
the simple game structure in terms of winning coalitions seems appropriate. However,
it is somewhat inappropriate to assume either that utility is transferable or that the final
20Farsightedness for this class of simple games was studied by both Ray and Vohra (2015) as well as
DV (2017).
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decision or outcome brings the same aggregate benefit to the group whose vote wins the
day. Our formulation preserves the essential structure of simple games, so that winning
coalitions can enforce any outcome, but drops the assumption that aggregate benefits are
equal no matter the outcome that is chosen, and also transferability of utility.
Our focus is on monotonic and proper simple games, such that:
(i) If S ∈ W , and S ⊂ T , then T ∈ W .21
(ii) If S ∈ W , then N − S /∈ W for all S ⊆ N .
GivenW , a coalitionB is a blocking coalition ifN−B is not a winning coalition. Let B
denote the set of blocking coalitions. A coalition is a losing coalition if its complement
in N is a winning coalition.
In this section, we will explicitly assume that a state consists of an outcome a from
some feasible set A (for instance, the set of legislative bills) as well as a partition pi of
N . That is, any state x is a pair (a, pi) and X = A × Π. Of course, a winning coalition
may not form. In such cases, we will assume that the outcome will be a distinguished
element a0 (the status quo), which is also in A. We use X0 to denote the set of “zero”
states in which no winning coalition has formed, so that a typical element of X0 will be
x0 = (a0, pi), with no element of pi being inW .
We assume that each individual i has a utility function defined over A and that
ui(a, pi) = ui(a) for all i ∈ N, (a, pi) ∈ X
That is, individuals care only about the bill that is passed or the decision that is taken by
the committee and not about the partition that represents the voting choices.
In a simple game, a winning coalition has the power to choose any outcome in A, while
a blocking coalition can ensure that the status quo a0 is the resulting outcome. The
only way in which a losing coalition T can change the utility allocation is if T leaves a
winning coalition S and S−T is not a winning coalition. So, for instance suppose |N | =
5 and any coalition of three or more is a winning coalition. Let pi = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}}.
Then, any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} can leave the coalition and ensure that a zero state emerges. On
the other hand, if pi = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5}}, then no singleton has any power to change
the outcome. This illustrates the limitations on the power of losing coalitions - if L is
a losing coalition which is a subset of a winning coalition S, then L can change the
outcome to a0 iff S − L is not winning.
In order to express these formally, we use the following notation. For any partition pi
and coalition S ⊂ N , let (S, piS) ∈ Π represent the partition where S is an element of
the partition and T ∈ piS iff T = R − S for some R ∈ pi. That is, if a coalition S forms
and deviates from pi, then the new partition consists of S and all original elements of pi
21So, N ∈ W .
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without members of S. We will also use (S, pi−S) to denote the partition with S as an
element and some partition pi−S of N − S.
The power of winning, blocking and losing coalitions is captured in the following as-
sumption, which describes two properties of an effectivity function for simple games.
Assumption 1. The effectivity function E satisfies the following
(1) For all S ∈ W , for all x = (a, pi) ∈ X , S ∈ E(x, y) if y = (b, (S, piS)) for any
b ∈ A.
(2) For all B ∈ B, B ∈ E(x, x0) for all x ∈ X .
(3) For all L ⊂ S ∈ W , for all x = (a, (S, pi−S)) ∈ X , (b, (L, S − L, pi−S)) ∈
E(x, L) iff a = b or [(b = a0) and S − L /∈ W ] .
Part 1 of the assumption implies that a winning coalition is eligible to induce state
(b, (S, pi)) from any state (a, pi). Part 2 just says that a blocking coalition can always
induce a zero state. Part 3 implies that a subcoalition L of a winning coalition S that
is not winning nor blocking can change the outcome only if the residual coalition, i.e.
S − L ceases to be a winning coalition. In such a case, no winning coalition forms and
so L enforces the status quo.
Given these restrictions on the power of coalitions and utility functions, the only relevant
details of a state not in X0 are given by the identity of the winning coalition S and the
outcome chosen by S.
We normalise utility functions so that ui(a0) = 0, and make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. For all S ∈ W , there is a ∈ A such that ui(a) > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Assumption 2 ensures that every winning coalition has at least one alternative that its
members strictly prefer to the status quo outcome.
In this setting, we derive a transparent necessary and sufficient condition for HSREFS
and HREFS in terms of sets of outcomes rather than sets of objection paths. As we have
mentioned earlier, the advantage of this more direct approach is that it is easier to check
whether a given set of social states Y can be supported as a solution. The intuitive reason
why it is possible to derive this direct characterisation is because of the special structure
of simple games - the only “powerful” coalitions are winning coalitions, or blocking
coalitions that have the power to prevent the complementary coalition from winning.
Importantly, we are also able to show that this stark distribution of power implies that
any absorbing expectation function satisfying Conditions I and E is an HSRE. That is,
neither version of maximality plays a role for NTU simple games in the presence of
history dependence.
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For any x ∈ X and S ∈ N , denote DS(x) = {y ∈ X : uS(y)  uS(x)}. Our
characterization is in terms of the system of sets {DS(x)}S∈N ,x∈X .
DEFINITION 8. A set Y ⊆ X satisfies Condition C if for any y ∈ Y , for any S ∈ N ,
z ∈ E(y, S), either z ∈ Y −DS(y), or there are B ∈ B, W ∈ W and x ∈ Y such that
x ∈ Y ∩DB(z) ∩ (DW (x0)−DS(y)).
REMARK 4. Note that this definition allows for the possibility that B = W . This will be
the case if there is T ∈ W and x ∈ Y ∩DT (z)−DS(y).
A set Y satisfies Condition C if the following is true. Take any y in Y and any S which
can deviate to z. Suppose z ∈ Y , but all members of S do not strictly prefer z to y. In
that case, one does not have to worry about the possibility of this deviation taking place.
In all other cases, we have to ensure that this deviation is blocked. Condition C states
that if S does deviate from y to z, then some blocking coalition B can precipitate the
status quo and then some winning coalition W can make a further deviation to x ∈ Y .
The state x has the property that all members of B strictly prefer x to z and all members
of W strictly prefer x to the status quo. On the other hand, someone in S is not better
off at x compared to y. So, if the expectation is that there will be a move to x following
a move to z, then the initial deviation will not take place.
Our main result of this section follows.
THEOREM 3. In all proper simple games, the following statements are equivalent for
any set Y ⊂ X .
(1) Y = µ(F¯ ) where F is an absorbing expectation function satisfying Conditions I
and E.
(2) Y is HSREFS.
(3) Y satisfies Condition C.
Proof. Since (2) obviously implies (1), it is sufficient to show that (3) implies (2) and
(1) implies (3).
Step 1: We first show that (3) implies (2).
Suppose Y satisfies Condition C. Pick any y ∈ Y , coalition S and z ∈ E(S, y) such that
z ∈ Y ∩ DS(y) or z ∈ X − Y . Define a function φ such that, for any y ∈ Y , for any
z ∈ (X − Y ) ∪ (Y ∩DS(y)) and S ∈ E(y, z),
φ(y, S, z) = (B, x0,W, x) s.t. B ∈ B,W ∈ W and x ∈ Y ∩DB(z) ∩ (DW (x0)−DS(y)).
Since Y satisfies Condition C, such a function φ exists. By construction, (z, φ(y, S, z)) =
(z,B, x0,W, x) is an objection path, for any such specified (y, S, z).
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We show that there is a strongly coherent collection of objection paths P with µ(P ) =
Y .
Let P1 = {(z, φ(y, S, z)) : y ∈ Y, S ∈ N , z ∈ E(S, y), z ∈ (X − Y ) ∪ (Y ∩DS(y))}.
Let P2 = {(x0,W, x)|(z,B, x0,W, x) ∈ P1}.
Construct P by
P = {(y)}y∈Y ∪ P1 ∪ P2.
We show that P satisfies parts 1-4 of Definition 7.
To check part 1 of the definition, note that (y) ∈ P for each y ∈ Y . Take any x /∈ Y . If
x ∈ X0, then B ∈ E(y, x) for all y ∈ Y,B ∈ B. So, choose some y ∈ Y,B ∈ B, and
note that px = (x, φ(y,B, x)) ∈ P1. If x /∈ X0, then for some S ∈ W , S ∈ E(y, x), and
px = (x, φ(y, S, x)) ∈ P1.
Part 2 follows immediately since P2 is a subset of P .
To check part 4, consider any path (y) ∈ P . Take any S ∈ N , and z ∈ E(S, x). If
z /∈ (Y −DS(y)), then pz = (z, φ(y, S, z)) ∈ P and µ(pz) ∈ Y −DS(y). So, (y) is not
S-dominated in P via z. If z ∈ (Y − DS(y)), then again (y) is not S-dominated in P
since (z) ∈ P .
For part 3, consider any path py ∈ P . Suppose py is S-dominated in P via some S.
Identify µ(py) = x. Since py is S-dominated in P , there is z ∈ E(S, y) such that
(5) uS(µ(pz)) > uS(x) for all pz ∈ P
Suppose z = (b, pi) /∈ X0. Then, S ∈ W . Since S is a winning coalition, S ∈
E(x, (b, pi′)) for some pi′ with S ∈ pi′. Using equation 5, it follows that (x) is S-
dominated in P . This is a contradiction since we have shown that part 4 of of Strong
Consistency is satisfied.
Suppose z ∈ X0. Now, py ∈ P1 ∪ P2. Since µ(py) = x, in either case, there is W ∈ W
such that (x0,W, x) ∈ P2. Hence, there is pz ∈ P such that µ(pz) = x, contradicting
equation 5.
Hence, P is indeed a strongly coherent collection of objection paths. It follows from
Theorem 2 that Y is HSREFS if Y satisfies Condition C.
This completes the proof of Step 1.
We now prove the other implication.
Step 2: We now show that (1) implies (3).
Take any absorbing F satisfying Conditions I and E, and suppose Y = µ(F¯ ).
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Take any y ∈ Y . Then, there must be a stationary history h such that F (h) = y. Take
any S ∈ N and z ∈ Y ∩DS(y). Since F satisfies Property I, (h, S, z) is not stationary.
So, there is pz = (z, B, x0, T, x) such that x ∈ Y −DS(y) and (h, y, S, z, B, x0, T, x) is
stationary.
Next, suppose z ∈ X − Y . Since z /∈ Y , (h, S, z) is not stationary. Then, Property
E again implies the existence of pz = (z,B, x0, T, x) such that x ∈ Y − DS(y) and
(h, y, S, z, B, x0, T, x) is stationary.
This shows that Condition C is satisfied.
Thus we conclude that in the class of simple games, it is possible to provide a direct
characterisation of HREFS ( and HSREFS) in terms of sets of outcomes. Perhaps,
more importantly, the theorem also demonstrates that maximality plays no role in simple
games.22
7. THREE APPLICATIONS
In this section, we describe three applications which are designed to show the roles of
history dependence and Maximality. We have remarked earlier that an important impli-
cation of history dependence is that punishments can now be history-specific. The first
application is designed to show that such punishments can be used to support efficient
outcomes. The final two applications illustrates the role of maximality by emphasising
the permissiveness of solutions like LCS.
Why History Dependence Matters
This is a model of global pollution abatement. Each country can undertake industrial
activities which result in low or high levels of pollution, labelled 0 and 1. Given other
countries’ choices, each country i strictly prefers choosing 1 to 0 because 0 involves
high cost clean technology. On the other hand, other countries prefer that i chooses 0
rather than 1. So, let xi ∈ {0, 1} denote a typical strategy of i. So, this is an example of
negative externalities. Payoff functions are given by :
(6) ui(x1, x2, x3) = xi − 1
2
(
∑
j 6=i
xj)
2
Consider the normal form game in which each country chooses its level of pollution si-
multaneously. The only Nash equilibrium is (1, 1, 1) whileO ≡ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
22On this issue, see also Ray and Vohra (2017).
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is the set of socially optimal allocations in the sense of maximising the sum of payoffs
for the countries. Notice that for all x ∈ O,∑
i∈N
ui(x1, x2, x3) = 0
We show that O is HREFS, though it cannot be sustained as a REFS. This shows the
importance of history dependence.
REMARK 5. In this example, O is also the LCS.
Let x0 = (0, 0, 0), x1 = (1, 0, 0), x2 = (0, 1, 0), x3 = (0, 0, 1), x4 = (1, 1, 0), x5 =
(1, 0, 1), x6 = (0, 1, 1), x7 = (1, 1, 1).
In order to keep the notation simple, we suppress the coalition structure and write a
state just in terms of an allocation. So, for instance, we will write (x0) instead of
(x0, {{1}, {2}, {3}} and so on. Also, we will write an objection path by describing
just the states figuring in the sequence and suppress mention of the coalitions that effect
the move since there will be no ambiguity about the latter.
The effectivity function follows straightaway from the underlying normal form game.
Any coalition S ∈ C is effective in moving from xk to xk′ if xki = xk′i for i /∈ S. That
is, the transition from xk to xk′ cannot involve any change of strategy of those not in S.
Note that since {1, 3} and {1, 2, 3} are not permissible coalitions, there cannot be any
immediate transition from x0 to x5 or from x7 to x0.
Let P be the set of objection paths given below along with all their subpaths so that P
satisfies Condition 2 of Coherence.
• (x0)
• (x1, x5, x7, x3)
• (x2, x4, x7, x1)
• (x3, x6, x7, x4, x2)
We want to show that the set P forms a coherent set. Before we go into this demonstra-
tion, we explain why the path (x3, x6, x7, x4, x2) is qualitatively different from (x1, x5, x7, x3)
and (x2, x4, x7, x1). Notice that in the latter two paths, coalitions {1, 2} and {2, 3} are
deviating jointly at x7. But, {1, 3} is not a permissible coalition and so this deviation is
not possible at x7. That is why we need 3 and 1 to deviate sequentially.
Clearly, P satisfies the first two conditions of Coherence. So, we only to check for
Conditions 3 and 4. Consider, for instance, (x1, x5, x7, x3), where the first coalition to
move (from x1 to x5) is country 3. Notice that µ(x1, x5, x7, x3) = x3. Since this is 3’s
most preferred outcome in O, (x1, x5, x7, x3) is not S-dominated by any S containing 3.
Analogous arguments show that Condition 3 is satisfied.
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We also need to show that x0 is not S-dominated in P in order to demonstrate that
Condition 4 of Coherence is satisfied. Consider any singleton coalition, say {1}. if
1 deviates to x1 (its only possible deviation), then since (x1, x5, x7, x3) is in P , and
u1(x
0) > u1(x
3), x0 is not 1- dominated in P . Analogous arguments hold for 2 and 3.
Finally, note that there is no two-person coalition S and outcome in O that is preferred
by S to x0.
This shows that O is HSREFS. An obvious question is the role of history dependence.
To see this, consider how x0 is supported as part of the HSREFS. Suppose 1 deviates
and chooses 1. Then, the objection path (x1, x5, x7, x3) is used to punish 1 for the initial
deviation. Notice that this requires that {1, 2} to deviate jointly at x7. Now, suppose 2
deviates at x0. Then, the objection path (x2, x4, x7, x1) is used to punish 2. This requires
{2, 3} to deviate at x7. History independence (as in REFS or CECB ) would not allow
two different continuation paths at x7, but is possible given history dependence.
Why Maximality Matters
This example illustrates the connection between Maximality and subgame perfection.
While the specific model is based on how the Conservative party in the UK elects its
leader, the same issues arise in other contexts.
The Conservative party uses a two-step procedure. In the first step, members of the
Conservative party in the House of Commons select a panel of two candidates from
the list of candidates seeking nomination if the latter set contains more than two candi-
dates.23 Successive rounds of voting are held if necessary, with the weakest candidate
being eliminated in each round until only two candidates remain. In the second stage,
all members of the party choose one candidate from the panel chosen by the members
of parliament.
In our model, we assume that only 3 MPs -x, y and z- are seeking nomination. Hence,
only one round of voting in the first stage is required to obtain a two-member panel.
Let N1 be the electorate in stage 1 and N2 in stage 2. We assume N1 = {1, 2, 3}
and N2 = {L(eave), R(emain)}. The latter definition is meant to represent the fact
that there are only two groups in N2, with individuals in each group having unanimous
preferences. While this is a simplifying assumption, it is not farfetched in the context of
the 2016 election when Brexit seemed to be the only issue concerning voters.
Let |L| > |R| so that L gets to decide the eventual winner.
23There were 5 candidates in the last contested election in 2016, and four in 2005.
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For each i ∈ N1, a strategy si is to eliminate one candidate.24 A strategy for each j ∈ N2
is a function sj selecting a winner from each two-element subset of {x, y, z}.
Let preferences be as follows :
• xP1yP1z
• xP2zP2y
• zP3xP3y
• zPLxPLy
• yPRxPRz
Assume that players also have a ranking over all nonempty subsets of {x, y, z}, this
ranking being consistent with preferences over singleton sets defined above and that any
singleton set is preferred over any set containing more than one element.25
Clearly, the optimal or maximal strategy for L is to choose z from any panel containing
z and to choose x otherwise. Given this, the subgame equilibrium path of play should be
for {1, 2} to eliminate z so as to ensure the eventual winner to be x. This must also be
the unique HREFS. In fact, history dependence plays no role here and so several history-
independent solutions like REFS and CECB that satisfy Maximality will coincide with
HREFS.
However, the LCS can also be supported by {1, 2} eliminating x or y, so that L chooses
z. A deviation of {1, 2} is deterred if {1, 2} expect L to choose y from {x, y}. So, the
LCS (and LCCS) will be {x, z}.
The next example uses Voting by Veto Procedures. Voting by Veto was first proposed
by Mueller (1978) as a way of inducing preferences for public goods. Various forms of
voting by veto procedures have been extensively analysed by H. Moulin26 amongst many
others. In the original procedure described by Mueller (1978), n individuals propose n
alternatives. The proposed alternatives along with a status quo x0 constitute the issue
set. The voters then sequentially veto one alternative from the set that has not been
vetoed already. Since there are n + 1 alternatives and n voters, exactly one alternative
will escape a veto and this is declared the chosen outcome. In what follows, we will
avoid the proposal stage since that does not change the nature of the result, and focus on
the vetoing stage.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {x0, x, y.z} be the issue set. Suppose the order of sequential
vetoing is 1, 2, 3. Then, individual 1’s strategy is to pick one alternative from A (the
24Some tie-breaking rule, which is irrelevant for our purpose, is used to select the eliminated candidate
if each i selects a different candidate.
25This is an “artificial assumption in order to fit the model with our general framework.
26See for instance Moulin (1983).
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alternative vetoed by 1) , individual 2’s strategy is to pick one alternative from each
three-element subset ofA, while 3 picks one alternative from each two-alternative subset
of A.
Let individual preferences over A be
• x1P1x2P1x0P1x3
• x0P2x1P2x2P2x3
• x3P3x0P3x1P3x2
Extend these preferences over all two-element and three-element subsets of A such that
individual elements are strictly preferred to all supersets that can be constructed out of
A. We do this because X will be the set of all non-empty subsets of A. Then, the unique
HREFS will involve 1 vetoing x0, 2 vetoing x3 and 3 vetoing x2 yielding the outcome x1.
However, the LCS (and LCCS) will also include x0 if 1 vetoes x3 under the pessimistic
assumption 2 will not veto x3. This is clearly a non-maximal move by 2 and so 1 should
not expect this to take place.
It is easy to construct another preference profile where the farsighted stable set gives the
wrong prediction because of a violation of maximality.
Applications 2 and 3 also illustrate the close connection between subgame perfection
and maximality in our framework despite the cooperative nature of our solution concept.
This point has also been emphasized by Kimya in the context of ECB and CECB.
8. PROPERTIES OF HREFS
In this section, we describe some results on the structure and properties of HREFS. We
point out at the end of the section that analogous results also go through for HSREFS.
PROPOSITION 1. Let P 1 and P 2 be coherent collections of objection paths. Then, P 1 ∪
P 2 is also a coherent collection of objection paths.
Proof. Let P 1 and P 2 be coherent collections of objection paths. Let P¯ = P 1 ∪ P 2. We
show that P¯ satisfies all the conditions specified in Definition 6.
Clearly, P¯x is nonempty since P 1x and P
2
x are both nonempty, implying Definition 6.1.
Take any p¯ = (x0, S1, x1, . . .) ∈ P¯ . Without loss of generality, p¯ ∈ P 1. Then, by
Definition 6.2, (xk, Sk+1, . . .) ∈ P 1 ⊂ P¯ , for any k.
Finally, notice that if S does not dominate some p in a set P , then S does not dominate
p in P ′ with P ⊂ P ′. This shows that P¯ satisfies Definitions 6.3 and 6.4
So, P¯ is a coherent collection of paths.
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The following is immediate.
COROLLARY 1. If Y 1 and Y 2 are both HREFS, then so is Y 1 ∪ Y 2.
Notice that this corollary establishes that there is a largest HREFS whenever X is finite.
We now show that HREFS is a refinement of Chwe’s consistent sets. Even the largest
(in terms of set inclusion) HREFS is a subset of the largest consistent set. Moreover,
Example 2 demostrates that HREFS can be a strict subset of LCS. As we have remarked
before, this makes HREFS a more attractive solution concept given the usual criticism
of the LCS is that it is too permissive.
PROPOSITION 2. If P is a coherent collection paths, then µ(P ) is a consistent set.
Proof. Suppose that µ(P ) is not a consistent set.
Then there is x ∈ µ(P ), y and S ∈ E(x, y) such that uS(z)  uS(x), for all objection
paths (z0, S1, ..., Sm, zm) with z0 = y and zm = z ∈ µ(P ).
But since P is a subset of all objection paths, this contradicts the assumption that (x) is
not S−covered in P via y.
The farsighted stable set (Definition 3) is not necessarily HREFS in abstract games since
domination chains may violate maximality.
However, as we have demonstrated in Section 6, the problem of maximality disappears
in simple games. This essentially yields the following.27
PROPOSITION 3. If V is a farsighted stable set in a simple game, then V is HREFS.
It is trivial that V must satisfy Conditions I and E. So, this result follows from our
characterization result on simple games.
9. NONEMPTYNESS RESULTS
In this section, we show that a non-empty HREFS exists both when the set of social
states X is finite as well as in the case of transferable utility partition function games. In
fact, we prove a stronger result in the latter case by constructing a non-empty HSREFS.
27See Ray and Vohra (2017) for a related result.
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9.1. The Finite Case. Suppose X , the set of social states, is finite. Since we make no
other assumptions about the abstract game, this covers a wide variety of cases such as
hedonic games, social network games without monetary transfers, etc.
We provide a constructive proof that HREFS is nonempty in all finite games.
For any set of objection paths P , define
ud(P ) = {(x0, S1, x1, ...) ∈ P : for all k, (xk, Sk+1, xk+1, ...) is not Sk+1-dominated in P} .
LEMMA 3. Let P ⊆ P ′. Then ud(P ) ⊆ ud(P ′).
Proof. For any (x0, S1, x1, ...) and any k = 0, 1, ..., if (xk, Sk+1, xk+1, ...) is dominated
in P ′ via y, then it is dominated in P via y. Conversely, if (xk, Sk, xk+1...) is not domi-
nated in P via any y and for any k, then it is not dominated in P ′ via any y and for any
k.
Recall that P ∗ denotes the set of all objection paths. Define UD0 ≡ P ∗, and UDt ≡
ud(UDt−1), for all t = 0, 1, 2, ....
By Lemma 3, UDt+1 ⊆ UDt. Denote by
UUD = ∩tUDt
the ultimate undominated set associated to the problem. So, the ultimate undominated
set is the limit set, obtained by recursively eliminating dominated objection paths. No-
tice that if X is a finite set, then only finitely many elimination rounds are needed.
The next lemma provides a condition under which UUD is a coherent collection.
LEMMA 4. Let P = UUD. If Px is nonempty for all x, then P is a coherent collection
of paths.
Proof.
It is clear that P satisfies Definition 6.2-4. So, if Px is nonempty for all x, then P is a
coherent collection of objection paths.
Let P be any other coherent collection of objection paths. We show by induction that
P ⊆ UDt, for all t = 0, 1, ....
It is clear that P = ud(P ) since no path is P is dominated because of Definitions 6.3-4.
By assumption P ⊆ P ∗ = UC0. Let P ⊆ UDt. Then, by Lemma 3, P = ud(P ) ⊆
ud(UDt) = UDt+1. Hence UUD contains all coherent collections, and µ(P ) is the
largest HREFS.
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Given finiteness of X , the set of acyclic objection paths is finite. This implies that the
ultimate undominated set is, at each elimination round t, non-empty and well defined.
The difficult part is to show that UDt contains a path px with initial state x, for arbitrary
x ∈ X , as required by Coherence. The proof of the next lemma, which does this, is
relegated to the Appendix.
LEMMA 5. Let X be finite. For all x ∈ X , there is px such that px ∈ UUD.
The proof of the next theorem follows immediately from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
THEOREM 4. If X is finite, there is a non-empty HREFS.
9.2. Non-empty HSREFS for Partition Function Games. In this section, we prove an
existence result for HSREFS for the large class of games represented by superadditive
partition function games. In view of the demanding nature of HSREFS, this nonempty-
ness result demonstrates the power of history dependence.
Let Π be the set of all partitions of N . An embedded coalition is a pair (S, pi) where
pi ∈ Π and S ∈ pi. With some abuse of notation, we will use (N) to denote the embedded
coalition (N, {N}).
A TU partition function game is a mapping v specifying a real number v(S, pi) for each
embedded coalition (S, pi). That is, v(S, pi) is the sum of utilities that coalition S can
achieve if the partition pi forms. This formulation allows for externalities - what S can
get depends on the entire coalition structure.
For any coalition S ⊆ N , we let piS denote a partition of S, while ΠS denotes the set of
all partitions of S. Also, Π−S is the set of all partitions of N −S, with a typical element
pi−S .
For any pi and S, T ∈ pi, we use pi−S∪T to denote the partition of N − S ∪ T obtained
from pi. That is, R ∈ pi−S∪T iff R ∈ pi and R /∈ {S, T}.
Henceforth, we assume that v satisfies:
Superadditivity : For all pi ∈ Π, for all S, T ∈ pi, v(S, pi) + v(T, pi) ≤ v(S ∪ T, {S ∪
T, pi−S∪T}
Note that superadditivity ensures that for all pi ∈ Π, v(N) ≥∑S∈pi v(S, pi)
Throughout, we will also assume that the partition function v is 0-normalized so that
v({i}, pi) = 0 for all i ∈ N and all pi ∈ Π with {i} ∈ pi.28
We should specify the effectivity function associated with a partition function game.
Take any initial state x and suppose some coalition S deviates from x. It makes sense
28This is without loss of generality.
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to assume that S can choose any partition of ΠS , and that it cannot dictate how N −
S chooses a partition in ΠN−S . However, it is notationally complicated to explicitly
formalise the effectivity function. Fortunately, for our purposes it suffices to consider
only certain kinds of coalitional moves and so we do not need to describe the effectivity
function in full detail.
Let x0 ∈ X be the zero state such that ui(x0) = 0 for all i and pi(x0) = {{1}, . . . , {n}}.
That is, the partition formed in the zero state is one in which each element of the partition
of N consists of a single individual, and all corresponding embedded coalitions get zero
utility.29
We assume the following.
Assumption 3. For all i ∈ N , N − {i} ∈ E(x, x0) for all x ∈ X .
This is straightforward since N −{i} can always decide to break up into singletons. We
will use this assumption repeatedly in the proof of a crucial lemma.
DEFINITION 9. Player i is essential iff v(N) > v(N − {i}, {N − {i}, {i}}).
So, player i is essential if she adds positive value to coalition N − {i}. Let
Z = {x ∈ X :
∑
i∈N
ui(x) = v(N), ui(x) > 0, if i is essential}.
LEMMA 6. For all (x, y, k) ∈ Z ×X ×N , there is py such that uk(µ(py)) ≤ uk(x).
Proof. Choose any triple (x, y, k) ∈ Z ×X ×N . We consider two cases.
Case 1: uk(y) > 0.
Since y ∈ X , superadditivity implies that ∑i∈N ui(y) ≤ v(N). So, there is y′ ∈ X
(possibly y = y′) such that
∑
i∈N ui(y
′) = v(N), ui(y′) ≥ ui(y) for all i ∈ N
Suppose uk(x) > 0. Since uk(y′) > 0, this implies that there is z ∈ X such that∑
i∈N
ui(z) = v(N),
ui(z) > ui(y
′), for all i 6= k,
uk(x) ≥ uk(z) > 0.
Then, define py = (y,N − {k}, x0, N, z). Clearly, py satisfies all the requirements of
the lemma.
29The latter follows since v is 0–normalized.
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Next, suppose uk(x) = 0. Since x ∈ Z, i is not essential. So, v(N − {k}, {N −
{k}, {k}}) = v(N) Clearly, this allows us to choose z ∈ X such that z(pi) = {N −
{k}, {k}}, N − {k} ∈ E(y, z) and
ui(z) > ui(y), for all i 6= k,∑
i 6=k
ui(z) = v(N − {k}, {N − {k}, {k}}) = v(N),
uk(z) = 0.
Then, let py = (y,N − {k}, z). Again, py satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Case 2: uk(y) = 0.
Suppose k is essential, so that uk(x) > 0. Let {k} ∈ E(y, w) where {k} ∈ pi(w). Then,
uk(w) = 0. Note that we do not make any other assumption about pi(w) or ui(w) for
i 6= k.
Since k is essential,
∑
i 6=k ui(w) < v(N) Since uk(w) = 0, we can choose z ∈ X such
that
∑
i∈N
ui(z) = v(N),
ui(z) > ui(w), for all i ∈ N,
uk(x) ≥ uk(w).
Then, py = (y, {k}, w,N, z) satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Suppose k is not essential. If y ∈ Z, then py = (y) satisfies the requirements of the
lemma. If y /∈ Z, then either
(i)
∑
i∈N ui(y) < v(N) = v(N − {k}, N − {k}, {k}}), or
(ii) i 6= k is essential, but ui(y) = 0.
If (i) holds, then let py = (y,N − {k}, z) where
∑
i 6=k ui(z) = v(N − {k}, N −
{k}, {k}) = v(N), and ui(z) > ui(y) for all i 6= k, uk(z) = 0 Clearly, such z ∈ Z
exists and so py satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
If (ii) holds, then let i be essential, and ui(y) = 0. Then, let {i} ∈ E(y, w) where {i} ∈
pi(w). Using the fact that
∑
j 6=i uj(w) < v(N), we can choose py = (y, {i}, w,N −
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{k}, z) such that∑
j 6=k
uj(z) = v(N − {k}, {N − {k}, {k}}) = v(N), (since k is not essential)
uj(z) > uj(w), for all j 6= k,
uk(z) = 0.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Let PZ is the collection of objection paths terminating in Z:
PZ = {p ∈ P ∗ : µ(p) ∈ Z}
We will prove that Z is HSREFS by showing that PZ constitutes a strongly coherent
collection of objection paths.
THEOREM 5. Z is an HSREFS.
Proof. Take any y ∈ X . Choose arbitrary x ∈ Z and k ∈ N . Lemma 6 implies that there
is py ∈ PZ such that uk(µ(py)) ≤ uk(x). Hence, Py ∩ PZ is nonempty and Condition 1
is satisfied.
For any objection path in PZ , a subpath that begins from a state in the middle is also an
objection path of blocking coalitions with a terminal element in Z, and hence a member
of PZ . That is, Condition 2 is satisfied.
Next, take any pz ∈ PZ with x = µ(pz). Suppose that pz is S−covered via y for some
S. Choose some k ∈ S. By Lemma 6, there is an objection path py ∈ PZ such that
uk(µ(py)) ≤ uk(x), contradicting the assumption that pz is S−covered via y. Hence,
Condition 3 is satisfied.
Now, take any (z) ∈ PZ . Suppose that (z) is S−covered via y for some S. Choose
some k ∈ S. By Lemma 6, there is an objection path py ∈ PZ such that uk(µ(py)) ≤
uk(x), contradicting the assumption that (z) is S−covered via y. So, Condition 4 is also
satisfied and so PZ is indeed strongly coherent.
This shows that Z is HSREFS.
HSREFS need not be unique. We leave it to the reader to check that
W = {w ∈ X :
∑
i∈N
ui(x) ≤ v(N), ui(x) > 0, if i is essntial}
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is also HSREFS. Of course, Z ⊆ W .30
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies the consequences of memory on coalition formation. To this end, we
extend the rational expectation stable set solution of Dutta and Vohra (2017) by allowing
coalitions to condition their behavior on the history of blockings. The resulting solution
satisfies the same stringent stability properties as the Dutta-Vohra solution but has an
extra degree of freedom because of history dependence.
History dependence turns out to have very powerful implications. We show that a his-
tory dependent rational expectation solution exists under very general conditions, for
example whenever the set of states is finite. What is more, we demonstrate that even the
more stringent version of the solution, which requires that the current coalitional move
is optimal also for non-active coalitions, exists and is nonempty in all superadditive par-
tition function games. We are not aware of prior existence results in the literature with
similar robustness and existence properties. Our results suggests that the introduction
of history dependence in the study of coalition formation is a fruitful avenue for further
research.
11. APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 5: for all x ∈ X , UUD contains some objection path
originating from x.
Proof of Lemma 5
Since UD0 = P and hence contains objection paths originating from x, it suffices to
prove that for all x ∈ X , for all t = 0, . . ., if UDtx 6= ∅, then UDt+1x is nonempty as
well.
Choose some set P of objection paths. Find, for any x such that (x) 6∈ ud(P ), a coalition
S(x) such that (x) is S(x)−dominated in P .
For any x, identify a set C(x, P ) such that
(7) C(x, P ) = {y : (x) is S(x)− covered in P via y}.
Further, denote by C∗(x, P ) the subset of C(x, P ) that contains any y that induces the
maxmin payoff to coalition S(x) in C(x, P ). That is,
(8) C∗(x, P ) = {y ∈ C(x, P ) : max
z∈C(x,P )
min
p∈Pz
uS(x)(µ[p)) 6 min
p∈Py
uS(x)(µ[p))}.
30The proof that W is HSREFS is almost identical.
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Note that (x) ∈ ud(P ) if and only if C(x, P ) = C∗(x, P ) = ∅.
We say that (x0, S(x0), ..., xJ) is a C∗(·, P )−sequence that originates from x if x = x0
and xj+1 ∈ C∗(xj, P ) for all j = 0, ..., J − 1.
Denote by C
∗
(·, P ) the transitive closure of C∗(·, P ). 31 Denote the set of maximal
elements of C
∗
(·, P ) by V (P ) = {x ∈ X : y ∈ C∗(x, P ) implies x ∈ C∗(y, P ), for all
y}.
LEMMA 7. Let y ∈ C∗(x, P ). Then, for any py ∈ Py, the sequence (x, S(x), py) is an
objection path and it is not dominated in P ′ if P ⊆ P ′.
Proof. Since py is a member of Py, and x is S(x) covered in P via y, (x, S(x), py) is an
objection path.
If (x, S(x), py) is dominated in P ′, and P ⊆ P ′, then there is z such that
min
pz∈Pz
uS(x)(µ[pz)) ≥ min
pz∈P ′z
uS(x)(µ[pz)) uS(x)(µ[p)) uS(x)(x).
The third inequality, which implies that (x, S(x), py) is an objection path, follows from
the assumption that y ∈ C(x, P ). Thus the first inequality implies that also z ∈ C(x, P ).
But together with (7) this contradicts the assumption that y ∈ C∗(x, P ).
LEMMA 8. For any t = 0, 1, ..., for any x0 ∈ X , let (x0, S(x0), x1, ..., xJ) be aC∗(·, UDt)−sequence
with (xJ) ∈ UDt+1. Then (x0, S(x0), x1, ..., xJ) ∈ UDt+1.
Proof. Of course, UDt+1 ⊆ UDt for all τ . So, Lemma 7 implies that the sequence
(xj, S(xj), xj, ..., xJ) is not dominated in UDt, for any j = 0, 1, ..., J − 1. Since, in
addition, (xJ) is not dominated in UDt, we have (x0, S(x0), x1, ..., xJ) ∈ UDt+1.
LEMMA 9. For any t = 0, 1, ..., for any x ∈ X, there is y ∈ C∗(x, UDt) such that
(y) ∈ UDt+1.
Proof. Claim 1: For any t, if x ∈ V (UDt) and (x) ∈ UDt, then (x) ∈ UDt+1.
Proof : Suppose that (x) ∈ UDt−UDt+1 and x ∈ V (UDt). SinceX is a finite set, there
is a C∗(·, UDt)− sequence (x0, S(x0), x1, ..., xL) such that x = x0 = xL. By Lemma
8, (x1, S(x1), x2, ..., xL) ∈ UDt. But then, since xL = v0, x0 is not dominated via x1 in
UDt, a contradiction to the hypothesis that x1 ∈ C∗(x0, UDt). 
Claim 2: For any t, C∗(x, UDt) = C(x, UDt), for all x ∈ V (UDt).
31That is, y ∈ C∗(x, P ) if and only if there is a C∗(·, P )−sequence originating from x and ending in
y.
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Proof : Fix any x ∈ V (UDt). It suffices to show the directionC(x, UDt) ⊆ C∗(x, UDt).
If (x) ∈ UDt+1), then C(x, UDt) = C∗(x, UDt) = ∅.
Suppose that (x) 6∈ UDt+1.Since x ∈ V (UDt), there is a C∗(·, UDt)− sequence
(x0, S(x0), x1, ..., xL) such that x = x0 = vL. Choose any x′ ∈ C(x0, UDt). By
Lemma 7, (x0, S(x0), p′) ∈ UDt for any p′ ∈ UDtx′ . Iterating backwards on j =
L− 1, L− 2, ..., 2 it follows that
(x1, S(x1), ..., xL−1, S(xL−1), x0, S(x0), p′) ∈ UDt, for any p′ ∈ UDtx′ .
Thus ∪p∈UDt
x′
µ[p) ⊆ ∪p∈UDtx1µ[p) implying, by (8), that x′ ∈ C∗(x0, UDt). Since x′ is
an arbitrary element of C(x0, UDt), we conclude that C(x0, UDt) = C∗(x0, UDt).
Claim 3: For any t, for any x ∈ V (UDt) there is x′ ∈ C∗(x, UDt) such that (x′) ∈
UDt+1.
Proof: Initial step: t = 0. Then (x′) ∈ UD0 for all x′ ∈ X. By Claim 1, (x′) ∈ UD1,
for all x′ ∈ V (UD0).
Inductive step: t > 0. Let the claim hold for t − 1. We show it holds for t. By the
definition of V, C
∗
(x, UDt) ⊆ V (UDt) for all x ∈ V (UDt). Thus, by Claim 2,
(9) C(x, UDt) ⊆ V (UDt), for all x ∈ V (UDt).
By the maintained assumption, there is a x′ ∈ C∗(x, UDt−1) such that (x′) ∈ UDt.
Since C∗(·, UDt−1) ⊆ C(·, UDt−1) ⊆ C(·, UDt), also v′ ∈ C(v, UDt). By (9), v′ ∈
V (UDt). By Claim 1, (v′) ∈ UDt+1. 
Claim 4: For any x ∈ X, there is y ∈ C∗(x, UDt) such that (y) ∈ UDt+1.
Proof : If x 6∈ V (UDt), then there is y ∈ C∗(x, UDt) ∩ V (UDt). By Claim 3, there is
z ∈ C∗(y, UDt) such that (z) ∈ UDt+1. By transtitivity, z ∈ C∗(x, UDt).
It is now follows by Lemmata 8 and 9 that:
LEMMA 10. For any t = 0, 1, ..., for any x ∈ X, there is a C∗(·, UDt)−sequence
(x0, S(x0), ..., xJ) such that (x0, S(x0), ..., xJ) ∈ UDt+1x .
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
43
REFERENCES
Anesi, Vincent (2010), “Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 70, 488–493.
Anesi, Vincent and Daniel Seidmann (2014), “Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda,” Theo-
retical Economics, 9, 445–482.
Aumann, Robert and Roger Myerson (1988), “Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players
and of Coalitions, An Application of the Shapley Value,” in The Shapley Value: Essays in
Honor of Lloyd Shapley, Alvin Roth, ed., 175–191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beal, S., Durieu, J., P. Solal (2008), “Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU Games”, Mathemat-
ical Social Sciences, 56, 303–313.
Bhattacharya, A. and V. Brosi (2011), “An Existence Result for Farsighted Stable Sets of Games
in Coalitional Form”, International Journal of Game Theory, 40, 393–401.
Bloch, Francis (1996), “Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and
Fixed Payoff Division,” Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 90–123.
Bloch, Francis and Anne van den Nouweland (2017), “ Farsighted Stability with Heterogenous
Expectations,” mimeo.
Chander, Parkash (2015), “An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set”, mimeo, Jindal Global University.
Chwe, Michael (1994), “Farsighted Coalitional Stability,” Journal of Economic Theory, 63, 299–
325.
Diamantoudi, Effrosyni and Licun Xue (2003), “Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games,” Social
Choice and Welfare, 21, 39–61.
(2007), “Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency”, Journal of Economic Theory, 136,
105–125.
Dutta, Bhaskar and Rajiv Vohra (2017), “Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability”, Theo-
retical Economics, 12, 1191–1227.
Gomes, Armando and Philippe Jehiel (2005), “ Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic
Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies”, Journal of Political Economy, 113, 626–
667.
Greenberg, Joseph (1990), The Theory of Social Situations, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Granot, D. and E.Hanany (2016),“ Subgame Perfect Farsighted Stability”, mimeo.
Harsanyi, John (1974), “An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Al-
ternative Definition,” Management Science, 20, 1472–1495.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, Ana Mauleon, and Vincent Vannetelbosch (2004), “Rationalizability
for Social Environments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 49, 135–156.
(2009),“Farsightedly Stable Networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 526–541.
(2010), “Coalition Formation with Farsighted Agents”, Games, 1, 286–298.
Jordan, James (2006), “Pillage and Property,” Journal of Economic Theory 131, 26–44.
Kimya, Mert (2017),“Equilibrium Coalitional Behavior”, mimeo, Brown University.
44
Konishi, Hideo and Debraj Ray (2003), “Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 110, 1–41.
Lucas, William (1992), “von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets,” in Handbook of Game Theory,
Volume 1, ed. by Robert Aumann, and Sergiu Hart, 543–590. North Holland: Elsevier.
Mariotti, M. ( 1997), “ A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games”, Journal of Economic
Theory, 74 , 196–217.
Mauleon, Ana and Vincent Vannetelbosch (2004), “Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition
Formation Games with Positive Spillovers,” Theory and Decision, 56, 291–324.
Mauleon, Ana, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote (2011), “von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsighted stable sets in two-sided matching,” Theoretical Economics, 6, 499–521.
Mueller, Dennis (1978), “Voting by Veto”, Journal of Public Economics, 10, 57-75.
Moulin, H. (1983), The Strategy of Social Choice, North Holland : Elsevier.
Ray, Debraj and Rajiv Vohra (1997), “Equilibrium Binding Agreements,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 73, 30–78.
(1999), “A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,” Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 26, 286–336.
(2014), “Coalition Formation,” in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4, ed. by H.
Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, 239–326. North Holland: Elsevier.
(2015), “The Farsighted Stable Set”, Econometrica, 83, 977–1011.
(2017), “Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set”, mimeo.
Vartiainen, Hannu (2011), “Dynamic coalitional equilibrium,” Journal of Economic Theory, 143,
672–698.
(2014), “Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property,”
Theoretical Economics, 9, 187216.
(2015), “Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution,” Social Choice and Welfare, 42,
309-327.
von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Xue, Licun (1998), “Coalitional Stability under Perfect Foresight,” Economic Theory, 11, 603–
627.
